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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper traces the history of the pepper trade between Salem, Massachusetts, and 
the island of Sumatra. It attempts to fill the gap in historical knowledge of America’s 
early relations with Southeast Asia prior to its colonization of the Philippines in 1899, 
and covers the period from 1799 to 1846. The paper also discusses the implications 
that trade with Southeast Asian polities had on American foreign policy in the early 
period. The paper argues as well that American merchants’ arrival in the East Indies 
represented the weakening of the Dutch East India Company’s monopoly on the spice 
trade in Southeast Asia, which eventually ended in the company’s bankruptcy, the 
takeover of the East Indies colony by the Dutch crown, and a permanent change in 
Dutch policy that emphasized territorial conquest as a means of securing Dutch 
control over the archipelago. 
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PREFACE 
 
 The history of the United States has mainly been taught in high schools and 
universities through the lens of Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis that places 
America’s expansion to the west as central to the shaping of American national identity. 
While this is certainly true for much of the 19th century, it was not as certain in the earlier 
days of the United States. There was just as much push towards America becoming an 
overseas trading nation as there was towards the eventual Louisiana Purchase and 
Manifest Destiny. 
 Such was the condition of the young republic at the beginning of its existence, 
still busy finding its footing in the world. There was, however, as much enthusiasm 
between both the pioneers who headed west and the merchants who went overseas in 
search of their fortunes. While much has been written about the former, there is still 
precious little study about the latter, especially about early American pepper trading 
ventures in Southeast Asia pre-1898.1 
As an imperial power, the United States came very late into the colonization game 
that dominated the late 19th century. Its most serious attempt to expand far overseas 
remained the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, during which it 
acquired lasting foothold on the region now known as Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, this 
has meant that to a large extent the conquest of the Philippines has overshadowed other 
American ventures in Southeast Asia that, though not as large as the European ones, 																																																								1	I	have	chosen	the	time	range	of	roughly	a	century	or	so	between	1797	and	1898	as	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	and	particularly	1799-1846.	1797	marked	the	first	successful	voyage	of	an	American	vessel	to	Southeast	Asia,	and	1898	is,	of	course,	the	year	the	Spanish-American	War	broke	out,	at	the	end	of	which	the	United	States	took	over	the	Philippines.	However,	the	pepper	voyage	records	in	the	impost	book	at	the	Peabody	Essex	Museum’s	Phillips	Library	extended	only	from	1799	to	1846.	
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arguably shaped American interest in Southeast Asia. However, even the Spanish-
American War itself is not universally known among students in present-day United 
States. 
So it should not surprise anyone, therefore, that the pepper trade that begun in 
1797 between Salem, Massachusetts, and the Aceh Sultanate in what is today Indonesia, 
as well as the United States Navy’s punitive expedition to Quallah Battoo2 in 1832 has 
become virtually lost to American historical memory. Today the prevailing assumption 
among students of American history is that their nation was not interested in serious 
overseas ventures in Southeast Asia until 1899 or 1941, even then mostly in the 
Philippines without including other parts of Southeast Asia. 
This paper attempts to fill that knowledge gap, and argues that almost from the 
very beginning of the United States’ existence, individual Americans and the American 
government alike took an active interest in Southeast Asian affairs, focused on the island 
of Sumatra, even if this interest is merely an extension of American interest in trade with 
Qing China.3 This is apparent from the time the first Salem trading ships called on Aceh’s 
ports all through the 19th century. Obviously the shores on both sides of the Malacca 
Straits were dominated by European powers, Britain and the Netherlands, but the United 
States did manage to leave its lasting legacy behind as well in the form of commercial 
and diplomatic relations instead of colonial subjugation. 
 
																																																								2	Due	to	time	constraints	it	has	not	been	possible	to	track	down	the	native	Acehnese	names	of	the	locations	mentioned	in	this	paper.	Suffice	to	say	that	the	way	American	sailors	spelled	these	place	names	depends	on	the	preferences	of	each	account’s	individual	writer.		3	“Milestones:	1830–1860	-	Office	of	the	Historian,”	accessed	May	10,	2017,	https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/china-1.	This	article	is	a	concise	introduction	to	American	commercial	interest	in	East	Asia.	
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The Salem Pepper Trade, 1793-1846 
 To understand the context in which the United States became involved in the East 
Indies, it is necessary to trace a sketch of the trading relations between the port of Salem, 
Massachusetts, and the ports of the Aceh Sultanate on the very northern tip of Sumatra. 
One commodity in particular drew many American traders to Sumatra, and that is pepper. 
 Today, this spice is a ubiquitous presence alongside table salt in restaurants all 
over the world. At the beginning of the 19th century, however, acquiring pepper was 
dangerous and difficult not only because of the distance, but also because of the strict 
Dutch control over the spice trade by virtue of their presence in the East Indies. But 
foreign traders did attempt numerous times to get around this monopoly and bypass the 
Dutch middlemen. 
 It is this pepper trade and its impact on both America and Southeast Asia that this 
thesis will focus upon. Within the context of a Southeast Asia that is being slowly 
colonized by the Dutch and British, American arrival in Southeast Asia marked not just a 
curious footnote in United States history, but also a turning point in how European 
colonial powers expanded their spheres of influence in the region. Three consistent 
patterns emerged once America’s presence entered into Southeast Asian waters: 
 
(1) The arrival of the Salem pepper ships and their successful voyages challenged 
Dutch spice trade monopolies in the East Indies and was a sign, if not a cause, of 
the Dutch East India Company’s (hereafter VOC) collapse. 
(2) The VOC’s collapse in turn marked the permanent shift of Dutch priorities to 
territorial expansion in addition to trade monopoly. 
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(3) US Navy warships followed American merchant vessels due to pirate attacks, 
and the possibility of American expansion of influence in Southeast Asia 
accelerated Dutch colonial conquests in the region. 
 
This thesis will also raise these three themes as well, in order to highlight the importance 
of America’s role in the Southeast Asian trade network and its impact on colonial empire-
building. There is much work still to be done to document the early history of American-
East Indies relations, and I welcome all corrections to this thesis.4 
 
Background: History of the Pepper Trade 
 
 The Salem-Sumatra pepper trade was a period in which there was considerable, 
sustained relations between the United States and Southeast Asian polities. Yet it was 
only one part of an already intense exploration of East and Southeast Asia by American 
merchants, missionaries, diplomats, and naval officers. A 1972 article by Ronald Spector 
highlighted American interest in Southeast Asia well: “More than a decade before the 
United States concluded its first treaty with China, Edmund Roberts had negotiated, and 
the Senate had ratified a treaty with Siam, the first American treaty with an East Asian 
nation.”5 Such an occasion is rare, and it certainly did not happen within the context of 
the East Indies archipelago. Whereas Siam had the benefit of a central government, the 																																																								4	The	problem	of	terminology	is	always	present	in	the	writing	of	any	history,	so	it	is	difficult	to	determine	what	terms	to	use	as	descriptors.	I	have	avoided	using	the	word	“Indonesia”	to	describe	the	East	Indies	archipelago,	since	it	has	now	taken	on	the	meaning	of	the	modern	nation-state’s	name.	In	addition,	I	have	also	retained	throughout	this	thesis	the	American	renderings	of	native	Acehnese	personal	and	place	names.	5	Ronald	Spector,	“The	American	Image	of	Southeast	Asia	1790-1865,	a	Preliminary	Assessment,”	
Journal	of	Southeast	Asian	Studies	3,	no.	2	(1972):	299–305.	299.	
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unification of the East Indies would not take place until 1945.6 Thus American merchants 
in the East Indies conducted their businesses with local rulers on an individual basis. 
Even in Aceh, at the northern tip of Sumatra, where a Sultan held power, real governance 
was actually done by local chiefs in their enclaves along the coasts. 
 Traders from New England dominated the pepper commerce, especially those 
from Salem, Massachusetts. The roots of this pepper trade actually went back to before 
independence in 1654, when Elihu Yale, the famous founder of Yale University, “sent 
two of his employees to Atjeh … to establish the pepper trade.”7 However, between 1654 
and 1797 no trade was recorded, so perhaps Yale did not succeed in his intention to open 
up the pepper commerce. 
 That task would finally fall to Captain Jonathan Carnes; some 20 years after 
America declared her independence. This was a time of turbulent changes in Europe that 
saw the French Revolution and the rise of the First French Empire, in addition to the 
American Revolution itself. Consequently, an enterprise aiming to establish trade 
between North America and Southeast Asia needed to navigate not just the perils of the 
long voyage and pirates, but also European powers fighting with each other or, in the case 
of the Quasi-War and the later War of 1812, against the United States.  
Sometimes, however, these European powers would also utilize American 
vessels’ services to their advantage, especially during times of American neutrality. In his 
study of America-East Indies Trade, So Great A Proffit, James R. Fichter writes that, “In 
1795, authorities in the Netherlands hired an American vessel to make the Cape and warn 																																																								6	The	Dutch	had	more	or	less	completed	their	colonial	conquests	and	drawn	territorial	borders	with	other	colonial	powers	by	1912.	Another	50	years	would	pass	before	newly	independent	Indonesia	absorbed	the	last	remnant	of	the	Dutch	East	Indies	in	New	Guinea	in	1962.	7	“Salem	Massachusetts	-	Municipal	Information	At	a	Glance,”	accessed	May	24,	2016,	http://www.salemweb.com/community/city.php.	
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the incoming Dutch East India Company fleet of war with Britain. French officials 
returning from Ile de France, hoping to avoid stints as prisoners of wars, often made the 
trip on American vessels. Americans and other neutrals carried correspondence around 
the Indies and between the Indies and Europe for France and her allies”8 
But to return to Captain Carnes, there is as yet no full-length biographical 
treatment of his life. What is known, however, reveals that he came from a family that is 
already involved in the pepper trade, being “a nephew of Jonathan Peele, a substantial 
East India Merchant.”9 Carnes was only 31 years old when he went on his first, 
exploratory, voyage to Sumatra on board the brig Cadet in 1788, but he must have been 
an experienced captain of exceptional skill, for he not only discovered the route to the 
pepper ports of Sumatra, but also managed to return again with profit in 1797.10 
The Cadet departed Salem in April 1788, and by May she stopped at Madeira in 
Portugal. Thereafter she disappeared from the records, only to show up again in February 
1790 at the Cape of Good Hope. She finally made it back to the United States not at 
Salem but at some other port, perhaps New York or Boston.11 There is no clue to where 
the Cadet went between 1788 and 1790, but Carnes’ supercargo and brother-in-law 
William Vans Jr. later published an autobiography where he claimed “they visited 
Bencoolen, Tappanooley, and other pepper ports on Sumatra and brought home pepper, 
camphor, gold dust, and spices.”12 All of these are signs that Carnes’ voyage had borne 
fruit, and thus the missing records can be simply explained as a case of a captain and his 																																																								8	James	R.	Fichter,	So	Great	a	Proffit:	How	the	East	Indies	Trade	Transformed	Anglo-American	
Capitalism	(Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard	University	Press,	2010).	167.	9	James	Duncan	Phillips,	Pepper	and	Pirates:	Adventures	in	the	Sumatra	Pepper	Trade	of	Salem	(Boston,	Massachusetts:	Houghton	Mifflin,	1949).	9.	10	Ibid.	1-2.	11	Ibid.	2-3.	12	Ibid.	4.	
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crew keeping a trade secret. Carnes had laid down the foundations for a trade that would 
contribute significantly to Salem’s prosperity, so much so that even in 1889, long after 
the last pepper ship entered Salem’s harbor, 
 
“Every school boy in Salem knew where Java and Sumatra were. They had 
learned it at the knees of a grandfather who had probably been there himself 
but if he had not, he had heard them talked of for years.”13 
 
 His exploratory voyage a success, Carnes then decided to take another ship east, 
this time one by the name of Grand Sachem owned by Elias Hasket Derby.14  The 
voyage, however, ended when the Grand Sachem was wrecked at Bermuda.15 By 1795 
Carnes was ready to sail again to the East Indies. His ship, the schooner Rajah, was 
loaded with “two pipes of brandy, fifty-eight cases of gin, twelve tons of iron, two 
hogsheads of tobacco, and two boxes of salmon.”16 She was crewed by the following 
men:17 
 
 
 
 
																																																								13	Ibid.	5.	14	Ibid.	8.	15	Ibid.	16	Ibid.	10.	17	Peele	Family	Papers,	MH	5,	Phillips	Library,	Peabody	Essex	Museum,	Salem,	Mass.	(As	the	date	shows,	this	attestation	was	made	at	the	completion	of	the	voyage,	meaning	that	the	Rajah	sailed	out	of	Salem,	into	Sumatra,	and	returned	to	New	York	to	keep	his	trade	route	a	secret). 	
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August 26 1797 
Attestation of the Brig “Rajah”’s crew 
by the Public Notary Charles Adams: 
Name Station Native of Actual Abode Aged About 
John Snelling Mate Newfoundland Salem 25 
Samuel Silver Second mate Massachusetts Salem 28 
Benjamin 
Webb 
Seaman Massachusetts Salem 22 
Jonathan 
Richards 
Seaman Massachusetts Salem 31 
John Bishop Seaman Massachusetts Salem 23 
Scipio How Seaman Massachusetts Salem 29 
Benjamin Nick Seaman Massachusetts Salem 16 
Stephen 
Phillips 
Passenger Massachusetts Salem 30 
John Rambanz Cabin Boy France France ‘ 
Done at the City of New York 
Table 1: Attestation of the Rajah’s crew made upon the ship’s arrival in New York. 
It is not known if any crewmembers died during the voyage, so this list may not 
reflect the crew she departed Salem with. 
  
 
And Carnes’ instructions from his employers for this voyage is as follows:18 
 
Salem, November 3rd 1795 
Capt. Jonathan Carnes, 
 
 Our schooner Rajah now being ready for you will proceed from here 
directly to the Cape of Good Hope and then make all possible dispatch in 
disposing of your iron and lumber and purchasing Cape wines, with which 
you will proceed to the coast of Sumatra and thee dispose of them with your 
brandy, gin, and botty (?) and with the stock you which you will then have 
																																																								18	Ibid.	
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on hand load your vessel with pepper or any other kind of spice or produce 
that you may think it for our interest to purchase. If at your arrival in 
Sumatra the crop should be sold to that you cannot obtain a cargo of pepper 
you will employ the right in freighting or any other way which you shall 
think most for our interest till the next crop comes on. If you are able to 
obtain a cargo of pepper on your first arrival you will load as soon as 
possible and make the greatest dispatch back with your cargo to New York. 
If the price of pepper on your arrival should be so high as that you think it 
best not to purchase you are at liberty to use the right you shall think it most 
for our interest, always evaluating that while you are freighting you are 
risking all our stock and taking care that the freights are sufficiently 
advantageous to pay for that risk. Should you be convinced that a deviation 
from these orders in any case would be most for our interest you are at full 
liberty to depart from them. You may make your calculations from the 
prices current and mixed which are the purchase prices in America and from 
which they will not face more than 30 p. cents in considerable quantity 
should be imported. Wishing you a prosperous voyage we are your friends 
and business. 
 
       (Signed) Jonathan a Peele 
       Ebenezer Beckford 
       Willard Peele    
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 From the instructions above, it is clear that Carnes’ employers fully trusted him 
with every detail regarding the voyage, and gave him plenty of leeway on how he should 
manage the Rajah’s journey. Absent in the instruction is any consideration about cultural 
differences between the Americans and Acehnese, revealing perhaps the merchants’ 
assumption that Carnes had already acquainted himself well with the local Acehnese 
during his time on the Cadet. And once again, as with that earlier voyage, there are no 
records that detail the journey after the ship reached a certain port, only to reappear again 
once it approached America. James Duncan Phillips speculated that after the Rajah’s last 
sighting off the Cape of Good Hope in 1796,  
 
“Carnes and his little company probably headed northeasterly from the Cape 
before the gentle tropical breezes of the Indian Ocean and came far more 
comfortably to their destination. From Bencoolen he could have warily 
nosed his way among the coral reefs along the coast inside the outer islands, 
or he may have gone around outside it all and struck in at Tappanooley or 
wherever he had learned pepper was available.”19 
 
Phillips further suggested that Carnes probably went to several ports to fully load the 
Rajah with pepper, and had to wait for two harvests before he could finally set off on his 
return trip to Salem.20 The voyage went well for Carnes, and there are no records of 
altercations with pirates, but the Rajah did encounter a ship that showed hostility in the 																																																								19	Phillips,	Pepper	and	Pirates:	Adventures	in	the	Sumatra	Pepper	Trade	of	Salem.	10-11.	These	two	places	today	are	Bengkulu	and	Tapanuli	in	modern	Indonesia.	American	cartographers	and	sailors	of	the	18th	and	19th	centuries	usually	made	up	their	own	spelling	of	place	names	in	Sumatra,	some	of	which	are	still	recognizable	today.	20	Ibid.	11.	
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darkness of night while at anchor somewhere off Sumatra. Only after a skirmish that left 
their bow watch wounded did the Americans discover that their opponent had been the 
French privateer Resolute.21 Having lost one officer, the French apologized for the 
trouble, and the Rajah sailed away without further trouble until it reached New York 
harbor. Again, this is most likely how Carnes kept his trade secret, and although it was 
not very long before other traders discovered the route to Sumatra, Carnes was able to 
lead at least one more voyage to Sumatra in 1799 before he had to face competition. 
 
The Dutch: Conspicuously Absent? 
 Carnes’ voyages revealed not just a coveted profit-making commerce route, but 
also how easy it was to trade with the Acehnese and bypass VOC monopoly. The fact that 
the Dutch did not appear at all in the available records of the 1795-1797 and 1797-1799 
voyages shows that Dutch monopoly failed to cover the western coasts of Aceh, and that 
its ability to enforce its economic and territorial claims had severely diminished. Still, 
Dutch presence alone was enough to convince Carnes to seek out alternate trade routes to 
bypass the Dutch authorities.22 
 Dutch rule over the East Indies had been undergoing a decline for some time.23 
More than twenty years before the United States declared its independence, the Dutch 
																																																								21	Ibid.	13.	The	French	mistook	the	Rajah	for	the	British	brig	Persia,	perhaps	their	intended	target.	22	A	short	overview	of	the	VOC’s	history	can	be	found	at	“1602	Trade	with	the	East:	VOC	-	Timeline	Dutch	History	-	Rijksstudio,”	Rijksmuseum,	accessed	May	10,	2017,	https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/rijksstudio/timeline-dutch-history/1602-trade-with-the-east-voc.	23	The	Netherlands’	administration	of	the	East	Indies	more	often	than	not	relied	on	local	princes	and	regents	who	were	effectively	vassals	of	the	Dutch	crown,	as	shown	in	Multatuli’s	novel	Max	Havelaar.	This	system	of	indirect	rule	meant	that	colonial	government	could	be	effective	in	some	areas	such	as	Java,	but	unenforceable	in	other	areas	without	military	control,	such	as	Aceh.	
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committed the 1740 Batavia Chinese massacre.24 This upheaval led to a rebellion against 
VOC rule by both the Chinese and Javanese, and ended with a Dutch victory, but at a 
heavy cost. The rebellion meant that the company was by 1797 an already spent force, 
well on its way towards bankruptcy.25  Coupled with the instabilities of the French 
Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the French takeover of the Netherlands itself, it 
meant a power vacuum in the East Indies that threatened Southeast Asian commerce for 
European traders. 
 This situation proved profitable for American ship captains. Since the United 
States was a neutral party during the first years of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch government in Batavia came to rely on American shipping 
for people and goods alike. Fichter explained that, 
 
“Between 1795 and 1805, Dutch authorities hired twenty American 
merchantmen to run from the Netherlands to Batavia; nearly 300 additional 
American vessels arrived at Batavia in the same decade. Many brought 
colonial products back to the United States, often to be sold on to the 
Netherlands. Others sailed from Java to the Netherlands without Dutch 
																																																								24	English-language	sources	for	this	specific	event	is	scarce,	but	two	full-length	studies,	one	in	Indonesian,	and	one	in	Dutch	(also	translated	into	Indonesian)	give	an	excellent	background	as	to	what	occurred.	They	are,	respectively,	Daradjadi,	Geger	Pacinan,	1740-1743:	Persekutuan	Tionghoa-
Jawa	Melawan	VOC	(Jakarta:	Penerbit	Buku	Kompas,	2013)	and	Johannes	Theodorus	Vermeulen,	De	
Chineezen	te	Batavia	en	de	troebelen	van	1740.	(Leiden:	Ijdo,	1938).	25	Fichter,	So	Great	a	Proffit.	160.	The	Dutch	East	India	Company	had	already	effectively	collapsed	in	1795,	though	the	Batavia	High	Government	retained	much	of	its	administrative	framework	until	the	Dutch	crown	officially	took	over	governance	of	the	colony	in	1800.	Fichter	wrote	that,	“some	US	merchants,	confused	at	how	much	like	the	old	system	this	looked,	continued	to	refer	to	the	“Company”	on	Java,	but	in	fact	the	Dutch	Company,	as	a	shipping	concern,	no	longer	existed.”				
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sanction, flaunting the Dutch government’s monopoly, in theory at least, on 
the authorization of direct trade between colony and metropole.”26  
 
Could it be that Carnes gleaned some of his initial knowledge from these Americans 
hired by the Dutch? This was not the first time that a European power’s foreign 
contractors took over trade from their employers; two centuries before in 1595, a 
Dutchman by the name of Jan Huyghen van Linschoten published a detailed account of 
trading routes from Europe to the East Indies copied from the top-secret records of his 
Portuguese employers.27 This information leak was soon translated into English as well, 
and was a crucial factor in eventual Dutch success over the Portuguese in the East Indies. 
If Carnes knew about Linschoten’s book, the irony could not have been lost on him. 
 
The Peak of Salem-Sumatra Commerce, Other American Ventures in The East Indies 
 Carnes returned from Sumatra with a cargo that yielded 700 percent profit.28 In 
the first of his series of books on Salem’s maritime history, George Granville Putnam 
notes down the cargo that the Rajah carried back from Sumatra as follows: 
 
“She next entered the Salem Custom House, October 15, 1799, her cargo 
consisting of 158,544 pounds of pepper, 28 pounds Hyson tea, nankeen and 
																																																								26	Ibid.	161-162.	Phillips	also	devoted	the	entire	third	chapter	of	his	book	to	an	American	pepper	ship	that	went	to	the	Deshima	Dutch	factory	in	Nagasaki,	Japan,	illustrating	the	important	role	that	American	ships	played	in	facilitating	Dutch	commerce.	27	Jan	Huygen	van	Linschoten,	Iohn	Huighen	Van	Linschoten,	His	Discours	of	Voyages	Into	Ye	Easte	
[and]	West	Indies:	Deuided	Into	Foure	Bookes	(printed	at	London	by	Iohn	Wolfe,	printer	to	ye	honorable	cittie	of	London,	1598).	I.	
28	Phillips,	Pepper	and	Pirates,	14.	
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China articles, the duties being $9,512.64 on pepper, $8.96 on tea, 15 cents on 
nankeen, and $1.08 on china articles, a total of $9,522.83.”29 
   
In addition, some of the articles that Carnes carried back with him to Salem (a small 
chalice, double-ended smoking pipe, and a whale’s tooth) became the start of what is now 
the Peabody Essex Museum.30  
 Such a large return would inevitably arouse the interest of other merchants, 
Predictably other ships began to race towards Sumatra’s pepper trading ports. Accurate 
statistics on this trade are hard to come by, but it is certain that Salem’s pepper trade 
brought very large returns that are enough for numerous American trading ship captains 
to make the dangerous journey.31 
 News of Carnes’ successes galvanized other Salem traders, and thus the pepper 
trade steadily grew, booming at the height of the Napoleonic Wars when the Netherlands 
could not enforce its claims on the East Indies archipelago. The following table illustrates 
the progression of the pepper trade up until the imposition of the 1807 embargo:32 
 
 
 
 
																																																								29	George	Granville	Putnam,	Salem	Vessels	and	Their	Voyages:	A	History	of	the	Pepper	Trade	with	the	
Island	of	Sumatra	(Salem,	Massachusetts:	The	Essex	Institute,	1924).	8.	30	Ibid.	31	Ibid.	“Between	1799	and	1846,	179	ships	sailed	between	Salem	and	Sumatra,	with	even	more	landing	their	cargoes	in	other	European	or	American	ports.”			32	The	Salem	Custom	House	Records,	MH	261,	Phillips	Library,	Peabody	Essex	Museum,	Salem,	Mass. 	
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No. of Impost 
Book 
Date of Entry Name of 
Vessel 
Where From Amount of 
Duty 
 Dec. 31 1798 Aggregate Duties (for the year) $2,032,912.21 
¾ 
2 Oct. 10 1799 Brig Rajah Sumatra $9,522.83 
2 Dec. 7 1799 Bark Eliza Batavia $19,353.28 
 Dec. 31 1799 Aggregate Duties $2,488,933.66 
3 Oct. 22 1800 Brig George 
Washington 
Sumatra $1,803.09 
3 Dec. 10 1800 Brig Exchange Batavia $11,448.41 
 Dec. 31 1800 Aggregate Duties $3,060,319.54 
3 Jan. 12 1801 Ship Sally Batavia $16,036.71 
3 May 22 1801 Ship Henry Samarang 
(Semarang?) 
$16,419.43 
3 July 18 1801 Brig Rajah 
Pepper 
Sumatra $8,938.46 
3 July 29 1801 Ship Belisarius Bencoolen $20,357.16 
3 Oct. 15 1801 Ship Franklin Batavia $29,709.40 
3 Nov. 7 1801 Ship America (Muckie?) 
Sumatra 
$56,348.82 
 Dec. 31 1801 Aggregate Duties $3,741,598.83 
¾ 
3 Jan. 31 1802 Ship America Sumatra $112.24 m. 
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(Nov. 7 1801) pepper 
3 July 13 1802 Ship 
Belisarius 
Sumatra, Isle 
of France 
$20,910.48 m. 
pepper, coffee 
3 July 19 1802 Ketch Three 
Friends 
Batavia Sailed to 
another port 
3 July 28 1802 Ship Henry Batavia $17,029.43 
coffee, pepper 
3 Aug. 19 1802 Bark Eliza Mookee 
(Muckie?) 
$21,497.38 
pepper, coffee 
3 Aug. 28 1802 Brig William Batavia $8,106.23 
shoes, sugar 
3 Nov. 5 1802 Brig George 
Washington 
Sumatra $508.50 
pepper, 
coffee, 
molasses 
 Dec. 31 1802 Aggregate Duties $4,234,282.30 
¾ 
3 Jan. 22 1803 Ship Prudent Travical(?) $1,932.40 
pepper 
3 Sept. 12 1803 Ship 
Cincinnatus 
Sumatra $18,992.44 
pepper, coffee 
3 Sept. 21 1803 Ship 
Belisarius 
Sumatra $17,749.44 
pepper 
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3 Sept. 22 1803 Ship Minerva Sumatra Pepper, 
proceeded to 
foreign port 
3 Nov. 1 1803 Brig George 
Washington 
Sumatra $16,518.87 
pepper 
3 Dec. 10 1803 Ship John Sumatra rc $144.99 
indigo, coffee 
3 Dec. 27 1803 Ship Putnam Sumatra – 
Isle of France 
$27,634.67 
pepper, coffee 
 Dec. 31 1803 Aggregate Duties $4,978,360. 25 
¾ 
4 Feb. 19 1804 Ship Franklin Batavia $29,666.96 
coffee, pepper, 
sugar 
4 May 19 1804 Ship Herald Batavia $27,532.93 
coffee, sugar, 
molasses 
4 July 5 1804 Ship Hope Batavia $26,475.28 
Pepper, coffee, 
sugar 
4 July 18 1804 Ship Henry Batavia $16,611.09 
Coffee, sugar, 
pepper, wine 
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(?) 
4 Aug. 2 1804 Ship Recovery Batavia $22,423.85 
coffee, sugar, 
nutmeg, 
coffee, sugars 
4 Aug. 24 1804 Ship 
Cincinnatus 
Sumatra $416.40 
coffee, sugars 
4 Oct. 23 1804 Brig Sukey Sumatra $620.47 
pepper, 
coffee, indigo 
4 Nov. 23 1804 Brig Hope Sumatra To Leghorn 
 Dec. 31 1804 Aggregate Duties $5,787,613.50 
¾ 
4 Jan. 19 1805 Ship Good 
Hope 
Sumatra, Isle 
of France 
$19,195 
pepper, sugar, 
bottles (?) 
4 Jan. 22 1805 Schooner 
Freedom 
Sumatra, Isle 
of France 
$17,179.52 
coffee, cabbin 
(?), indigo, 
pepper 
4 Jan. 23 1805 Brig Aurora Sumatra $474.21 
pepper, sugar, 
coffee 
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4 May 22 1805 Ship Franklin Batavia $29,664.62 
coffee, sugar, 
pepper 
4 June 14 1805 Brig Sally Batavia $8,841.17 
coffee, sugar, 
candy (?) 
4 July 6 1805 Brig Argus Batavia $7,024.80 
coffee, pepper, 
nutmeg 
4 Aug. 10 1805 Ship Janus Batavia $21,231.42 
sugar, coffee 
4 Aug. 19 1805 Ship 
Cincinnatus 
Sumatra No goods 
landed 
4 Sept. 28 1805 Ship Recovery Batavia $19,670.56 
coffee, sugar, 
indigo, wine, 
bottles, shoes 
4 Nov. 11 1805 Ship Eliza Sumatra Proceeded to 
Leghorn 
4 Dec. 2 1805 Ship Concord Sumatra $4,424.22 
pepper, coffee 
 Dec. 31 1805 Aggregate Duties $6,807,320.22 
4 Apr. 31 1806 Ship Henry Batavia $12,514.08 
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coffee, sugar, 
mace 
4 Aug. 14 1806 Barque Eliza Sumatra $22,279.91 
coffee, pepper 
4 Aug. 26 1806 Ship Janus Sumatra Proceeded to 
Europe 
4 Oct. 20 1806 Ship Union Sumatra $28,506.26 
pepper 
4 Nov. 10 1806 Ship 
Cincinnatus 
Sumatra $20,286.66 
pepper 
4 Dec. 30 1806 Ship Lousia Padang $18,545.18 
coffee, 
pepper, 
cassia, coffee, 
cloves, raisins 
 Dec. 31 1806 Aggregate Duties $7,901,336.20 
5 Feb, 3 1807 Ship Argo Calcutta + 
Batavia 
$19,533.43 
sugar, tobacco, 
bottles 
5 Oct. 5 1807 Ship Eliza Sumatra $66,903.90 
wine, pepper 
5 Oct. 6 1807 Ship John Sumatra $22,098.50 
pepper, 
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coffee, cassia 
5 Nov. 2 1807 Ship 
Cincinnatus 
Sumatra $20,820.00 
pepper 
5 Dec. 18 1807 Ship Louisa Sumatra $35.64 pepper 
5 Dec. 28 1807 Ship Eliza Sumatra $35.64 pepper 
 Dec. 31 1807 Aggregate Duties $8,992,328.40 
Table 2: Record of impost, taken from digest of duties, for East Indies bound ships 
from the Rajah’s first entry in 1799 to the year 1807 when President Thomas 
Jefferson imposed his embargo act. Thereafter the pepper trade declined into 
sporadic voyages until it ended permanently in 1846. 
 
These records show the contribution of the pepper trade towards Salem’s and ultimately 
America’s economy. By 1807 there was extensive American maritime commercial 
activity in the Dutch East Indies in the form of the pepper trade and shipping service 
business. From 1799 to 1836 traders from Providence, Rhode Island also participated in 
the commerce on Java, showing how American maritime merchants from different states 
vied for the lucrative trade in the Dutch East Indies.33 Batavia became a frequent 
destination for American vessels, so much so that on November 24, 1801 the United 
States Government opened a consular office in the city.34 
 But the booming trade did not last very long. After peaking in the years 1805 and 
1806, as can be seen from the table above, President Thomas Jefferson signed the 1807 																																																								33	Sharom	Ahmat,	“Some	Problems	of	the	Rhode	Island	Traders	in	Java,	1799-1836,”	Journal	of	
Southeast	Asian	History	6,	no.	1	(1965):	94–106.	To	my	knowledge	this	is	the	first	study	on	the	subject	of	Rhode	Island	merchants	in	the	Dutch	East	Indies.	34	“Indonesia	-	Countries	-	Office	of	the	Historian,”	accessed	May	12,	2017,	https://history.state.gov/countries/indonesia	and	“Bilateral	Relations	–	Embassy	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	|	Washington	D.C.,”	accessed	May	12,	2017,	https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/bilateral-relations/.	Unfortunately	there	seems	to	be	no	trace	left	in	modern	Jakarta	of	where	the	site	of	this	consulate	is	since	American	relations	with	the	East	Indies	remained	sporadic	until	after	the	latter	formally	became	Indonesia.	
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Embargo Act that effectively crippled the Salem-Sumatra pepper trade and the Rhode 
Island Java trade.35 Neither ended immediately as a result of the embargo, but both trades 
irreversibly declined, and five years later the War of 1812 doomed the fate of American-
East Indies commerce.  
 
The First US Military Intervention In Asia 
 
 Why did the pepper trade between Salem and Sumatra go so well for so long and 
produced so much profit? Most likely the primary reason for the smooth transactions has 
to do with the fact that American ships came as independent merchants rather than 
representatives of large monopolies exemplified by the Dutch or British East India 
Companies. Company traders often had government backing in enforcing their role as 
middlemen, driving prices up, frustrating pepper suppliers and buyers alike. Acehnese 
traders would also have resented these monopolizing European companies’ aggressive 
policies that often led to territorial conquest, and so welcomed American merchants that 
came with purely commercial interest. For the American merchants, this meant that they 
could purchase pepper directly from local suppliers, bypassing Dutch middlemen and 
Dutch duties alike. Their persistence in pursuing the risky trade bears testimony to the 
Protestant work ethic that Max Weber expounded upon in his classic study. 
 Hence it was a shock to the Salem merchants when news of one of their ships’ 
hijacking became known. What had exactly happened? 
 																																																								35	“The	Embargo	Act	of	1807,”	accessed	May	12,	2017,	http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/us/c_embargo.html.	The	embargo	did	little	to	harm	its	target	Britain	but	greatly	damaged	American	overseas	commerce.	
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The Friendship Incident 
 The date February 7, 1831 would mark a turning point in the Salem-Sumatra 
pepper trade. On that day, the American trading vessel Friendship called on the port of 
Quallah Battoo to conduct pepper business.  What happened next was to cause uproar 
half the world away. After Captain Charles Endicott and a few members of his crew came 
ashore, a band of pirates snuck unto his ship and hijacked it, killing the crew left 
onboard.36 
 The Americans on shore managed to escape, and with the assistance of a local 
chief named Po Adam, finally reached other American trading ships in the area and 
together counter attacked the pirates, allowing for the Friendship to be retaken.37 Once 
the traders had returned home to America, news of the incident immediately generated 
outrage, yet at the same time the events that transpired in Sumatra remained mysterious to 
the traders, the American public, and the American government (then led by President 
Andrew Jackson) alike, since this attack was the first of its kind. Why did it happen in the 
first place? 
 Within Sumatra itself, the Sultanate of Aceh immediately investigated the 
incident. In his book on Acehnese diplomatic history, M. Nur El Ibrahimy writes that 
there were two probable main causes that led to the attack on Friendship. One is 
Acehnese anger at American pepper traders that cheated them out of pepper using a 
tampered scale. Apparently this happened often enough as to cause considerable losses to 
the Acehnese pepper suppliers. Sacks of pepper that the Americans bought suddenly 
																																																								36	Ibid.	37	Ibid.	As	a	consequence	of	his	assistance	to	the	Americans,	Po	Adam	later	had	to	face	not	just	shunning	and	ridicule,	but	also	threats	to	his	life	as	well	from	his	own	people,	as	he	wrote	in	a	letter	to	Salem	trader	Joseph	Peabody.	
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became mysteriously heavier when the Americans sold it to other Acehnese, causing no 
small amount of resentment. The other cause, as the Acehnese investigation reveals, is 
the Dutch colonial government’s intrigue to interfere in the pepper trade. Apparently the 
“pirates” that attacked the Friendship had been mercenaries in Dutch service that the 
colonial government contracted to smear Aceh’s reputation, painting it as incompetent at 
best and treacherous at worst. At the time of the attack these pirates used a captured 
Acehnese ship and flew the flag of the Aceh Sultanate.38 
 Whether or not the results of the Acehnese inquiry ever reached the United States 
government was not certain. But in America itself a number of senators that had invested 
in the Friendship’s voyage began to call for military retribution.39 
 
The USS Potomac’s expedition to Sumatra 
 Anyone who has studied American naval history would be familiar with the 
Barbary Wars. This was the naval expedition launched in response to attacks on 
American shipping by North African pirates and immortalized in the famous line in the 
US Marines’ Hymn: “To the Shores of Tripoli.” 																																																								38	M	Nur	El	Ibrahimy,	Selayang	Pandang:	Langkah	Diplomasi	Kerajaan	Aceh	(Jakarta:	Gramedia	Widiasarana	Indonesia,	1993),	23-24.	However,	Ibrahimy	does	not	provide	evidence	for	either	theory	or	even	if	the	Acehnese	Sultan	ordered	an	investigation	at	all.	Instead,	David	F.	Long,	in	his	article	““Martial	Thunder”:	The	First	Official	American	Armed	intervention	in	Asia”,	supplied	Endicott’s	account	that	pointed	to	widespread	cheating	by	both	Acehnese	and	Americans	as	the	cause,	with	the	former	frequently	adulterating	their	pepper	with	rocks	or	sand	and	the	latter	by	using	irregular	weights.	(David	F.	Long,	“‘Martial	Thunder’:	The	First	Official	American	Armed	Intervention	in	Asia,”	
Pacific	Historical	Review	42,	no.	2	(1973):	143–62,	doi:10.2307/3638464.	146-147)	39	Spector,	“The	American	Image	of	Southeast	Asia	1790-1865,	a	Preliminary	Assessment.”	300.	By	the	time	of	the	Friendship	incident,	there	was	already	enough	knowledge	of	the	region	to	form	an	American	perception	of	Southeast	Asia.	Spector	wrote	in	his	article,	“In	general,	most	American	observers	saw	the	nations	of	Southeast	Asia	as	extremely	backward	in	the	extreme.”	American	attitudes,	however,	greatly	varied.	Merchants	did	not	seek	new	trading	posts	or	privileges	for	Americans,	but	Navy	officers	such	as	Commodore	Matthew	Perry	saw	that	America	would	inevitably	need	to	intervene	in	Southeast	Asia.	Missionaries	also	had	mixed	opinions	on	colonialism,	yet	agreed	that	contact	with	America	could	serve	to	bring	civilization	to	Southeast	Asia.	
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 So it is no surprise then, that with the Barbary pirates’ defeat still fresh in national 
memory, President Jackson authorized a naval expedition to inflict punishment on the 
Sumatran bandits that attacked the Friendship. The vessel chosen for this endeavor was 
the USS Potomac. Originally assigned only to go to Britain, it now received orders to go 
to Sumatra instead.  
Figure 1: Map of the USS Potomac's expedition40 
 Francis Warriner, a schoolmaster charged with educating the midshipmen aboard 
the Potomac, put the entire voyage into writing.41 Warriner relates the abrupt change in 
attitude among American maritime merchants, stating that, “for several years, the 
deportment of the natives of that island toward our countrymen, had become more and 
																																																								40	Karen	Goodrich-Hedrick	and	John	D.	Hedrick,	“Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac,”	
Expedition	Magazine	14.2	(1972):	28.	41	Ibid.	29.	One	should	keep	in	mind	that	the	United	States	Naval	Academy	was	only	established	in	1845.	Before	that	it	was	the	usual	practice	for	the	sons	of	naval	officers	to	train	aboard	vessels	as	midshipmen	from	a	very	early	age,	perhaps	as	young	as	ten,	hence	the	need	for	a	schoolmaster	to	accompany	the	Potomac’s	expedition.		
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more treacherous.”42 While he does not explain the immediate cause of the attack on 
Friendship, his statement here confirms that the change in American-Acehnese relations 
did not happen as a result of one event but was rather the accumulation of several causes 
throughout the years. 
 Commodore John Downes, in command of the Potomac, received detailed 
instructions on what to do and accomplish in Quallah Battoo from the Secretary of the 
Navy Levi Woodbury.43 The commodore was to gather intelligence and exercise all the 
necessary precautions before considering armed engagements, and he ordered the crew to 
conceal the ship’s armaments as they approached Sumatra after the ship crossed the 
Atlantic, and even hoisted Danish colors, making the ship appear as though it were “a 
large Indiaman.”44 For his part Warriner continued to write down his observations of the 
Sumatran coast, and his writings revealed a keen observer who was not dismissive of 
detail. For instance, when he discussed the indigenous inhabitants of Aceh he accurately 
concluded that, “The inhabitants, in general terms, are denominated Malays, though this 
is incorrect, as there are several aboriginal tribes, in the interior, who are pagan. The term 
Malay, among the people, is synonymous with that of Mohammedan.”45 
																																																								42	Francis	Warriner,	Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac	Round	the	World	During	the	Years	
1831-1834.	Embracing	the	Attack	on	Quallah-Battoo	with	Notices	of	Scenes,	Manners,	Etc.,	in	Different	
Parts	of	Asia,	South	America,	and	the	Islands	of	the	Pacific	(New	York:	Leavitt,	Lord	&	Company;	Crocker	&	Brewster,	1835).	11.	43	Goodrich-Hedrick	and	Hedrick,	“Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac,”	33.	44	Ibid.	71.	45	Warriner,	Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac	Round	the	World	During	the	Years	1831-1834.	
Embracing	the	Attack	on	Quallah-Battoo	with	Notices	of	Scenes,	Manners,	Etc.,	in	Different	Parts	of	Asia,	
South	America,	and	the	Islands	of	the	Pacific.	73-74.	
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Figure 2: The Frigate USS Potomac in Valparaiso Harbor46 
 
 The Potomac continued on its reconnaissance of the Western Acehnese coast, and 
came across some Acehnese fishermen that offered to sell the Americans their catch. 
Fearing that the fishermen would alert the pirates to the Potomac’s presence, the 
American sailors decided to detain them. Upon questioning the captured Acehnese 
identified as being from Tally Pow and not Quallah Battoo.47 They would later be 
released as the Potomac completed her mission. 
 Commodore Downes then decided that the time for armed action had come. 
Warriner did not mention why Downes chose this course of action, but it is possible that 
during the voyage to Sumatra he had become convinced that the Acehnese at Quallah 
Battoo would not cooperate with his investigation.48 Ibrahimy criticizes Downes’ actions 																																																								46	Goodrich-Hedrick	and	Hedrick,	“Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac,”	33.	47	Warriner,	Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac	Round	the	World	During	the	Years	1831-1834.	
Embracing	the	Attack	on	Quallah-Battoo	with	Notices	of	Scenes,	Manners,	Etc.,	in	Different	Parts	of	Asia,	
South	America,	and	the	Islands	of	the	Pacific.	79-80.	48	Jeremiah	N.	Reynolds,	Voyage	Of	The	United	States	Frigate	Potomac:	Under	The	Command	Of	Commodore	John	Downes,	During	
The	Circum-Navigation	Of	The	Globe,	In	The	Years	1831,	1832,	1833,	And	1834	(New	York:	Harper	&	Brothers,	1835).	95-96.	
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in disguising his ship and sending the Potomac’s marine detachment (260 strong) ashore 
to assault Quallah Battoo, and indeed Downes was later heavily criticized upon his return 
to the United States.49  
Jeremiah Reynolds, an American adventurer who had joined the Potomac crew as 
Downes’ secretary, described the attack in detail.  Downes gave orders to the marines and 
seamen to cut off all avenues of escape and to force the Quallah Battoo Rajahs to 
negotiate, but under no circumstances were they to commence hostilities, unless they 
were attacked first. Only then could the landing party commence full-scale assault on 
Quallah Battoo, but with strict orders not to harm any unarmed inhabitants.50 
 Around 2:00 AM on February 6th 1832, the marines and seamen of the USS 
Potomac boarded their boats and came ashore on the coast of Quallah Battoo.51 Though 
they could not have realized it at the time, this was the very first government-sanctioned 
American military operation anywhere in Asia.52  
It was clear to the marines that they faced a difficult fight. Of the scene’s location, 
Reynolds wrote:  
 
“The town of Quallah-Battoo does not contain less than two thousand 
inhabitants, and nearly five hundred fighting men. … It is regularly laid out 
																																																								Reynolds	describes	how	Downes	consulted	with	British	officers	in	Cape	Town,	and	Ibrahimy	writes	that	the	British	managed	to	convince	Downes	of	the	slim	probability	of	a	peaceful	solution.	But	the	British	themselves	at	this	time	were	facing	piracy	in	the	Malacca	Straits,	so	it	is	possible	that	they	deliberately	directed	Downes	to	attack	Quallah	Battoo	to	have	some	of	the	pirates	eliminated	without	having	to	send	any	Royal	Navy	ships.	Long,	however,	suggested	that	the	British	had	lost	interest	in	Sumatra	since	the	1824	Anglo-Dutch	treaty.	(Long,	“Martial	Thunder.”	146.)	49	M.	Nur	el	Ibrahimy,	Selayang	Pandang	Langkah	Diplomasi	Kerajaan	Aceh	(Jakarta:	Gramedia	Widiasarana	Indonesia,	1993).	26-27.	50	Reynolds,	Voyage	Of	The	United	States	Frigate	Potomac:	Under	The	Command	Of	Commodore	John	Downes,	During	The	
Circum-Navigation	Of	The	Globe,	In	The	Years	1831,	1832,	1833,	And	1834.	107.	51	Ibid.	108.	52	Sabri	Zain,	“The	US	Attack	on	Kuala	Batu,”	accessed	May	22,	2016,	http://www.sabrizain.org/malaya/potomac.htm.	
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into streets, interspersed with jungle and cocoanut-trees, and contains five 
forts, each owned and commanded by different rajahs or chiefs.”53 
 
The men did not need to wait long for action. One of the Acehnese in the fort fired off a 
shot at the marines, thus commencing hostilities.  Lieutenant Hoff, one of the marine 
officers, tried to convince the natives to cease hostilities with what little Malay he 
learned, but it was in vain.54 Now the Americans had to advance against stiff resistance 
from the Acehnese of Quallah Battoo. 
 The attack that followed demonstrated well the results of US Marine training and 
discipline. Though they numbered no more than 260, the marines managed to breach the 
fort and carry the fight to the Acehnese. Warriner describes the Acehnese last stand inside 
the fort: 
 
“The resistance of the natives was in vain. The fort was stormed and soon 
carried; not, however, till almost every individual in it was slain. To’onkou 
N’yamat, usually called Po Mahomet, a chief of much distinction among the 
people, who had been principally concerned in the piratical act of taking the 
Friendship, lost his life at this fort. The mother of Chadoolah, another rajah, 
was also slain here. Another woman met her death at this fort, but her rank 
was not ascertained; she fought with the spirit of a desperado.”55  
																																																								53	Reynolds,	Voyage	Of	The	United	States	Frigate	Potomac:	Under	The	Command	Of	Commodore	John	
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The fact that many Acehnese women also joined the men in fighting the Americans must 
have struck Warriner, although Reynolds did not make much mention of the Acehnese 
women. The number of women who were killed perhaps dismayed Warriner himself, but 
he noted that the casualties resulted directly from the Acehnese resistance to the 
marines.56  
 
Figure 3: Painting of the assault on Quallah Battoo from the US Marine Corps art 
collection57 
 																																																								
South	America,	and	the	Islands	of	the	Pacific.	88-89.	Ibrahimy	condemns	the	American	attack	on	Quallah	Battoo	due	to	the	fact	that	all	Acehnese	in	the	fort	was	killed,	but	he	does	not	list	either	Reynolds’	or	Warriner’s	account	in	his	bibliography,	thus	calling	the	validity	of	his	evaluation	of	the	Quallah	Battoo	action	into	question.	56	There	must	have	been	a	tradition	of	Acehnese	women	fighting	alongside	the	men	against	foreign	military	forces,	since	it	recurred	again	in	the	war	between	Aceh	and	the	Netherlands	from	1873	to	1904.	57	Colonel	Charles	H.	Waterhouse,	USMCR,	Charles	R.	Smith,	and	Richard	A.	Long,	Marines	in	the	
Frigate	Navy:	Fourteen	Full-Color	Prints	(Washington,	DC:	United	Staes	Marine	Corps	History	Division,	2006).	13.	
	 Harry	Chandra	Suwanto	
	 39	
The battle of Quallah Battoo ended with many wounded on the American side, and two 
men killed.58 The loss on the part of the Acehnese is unknown, but it must have been 
much heavier. 
 Several Acehnese from the neighboring town of Soo Soo came after the battle to 
greet the American expedition, bringing gifts as tokens of friendship, and seemed to be 
rather pleased with the outcome of the Quallah Battoo action.59 
The marines encountered no further hostility with the locals. 
   
 
Figure 4: Map of Quallah Battoo and its environs60 
 
The next day Downes received the friendly Rajah Po Adam, who had saved the 
Friendship’s crew. He revealed to the Americans that he had been observing what 
																																																								58	Warriner,	Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac	Round	the	World	During	the	Years	1831-1834.	
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happened closely, and for his efforts was treated to a tour of the Potomac.61 Once he left, 
Downes ordered a bombardment of Quallah Battoo and its surrounding area. This early 
example of “gunboat diplomacy,” as Ibrahimy called it, made a considerable impression 
on the Acehnese.62 The rest of the Potomac’s cruise around the Dutch East Indies 
consisted mainly of exploring the Sumatran coasts and visiting Java to pay courtesy to the 
Dutch colonial government there.63 In Batavia Warriner learned of at least one American 
who went as a missionary to Java, although he could not manage to meet with the man. 
This was David Abeel, one of the earliest American Protestant missionaries to Southeast 
Asia and China affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church and himself a descendant of 
Dutch colonists.64 Just like in the European trade with Southeast Asia, the American 
pepper trade opened possibilities for missionaries to spread their message as well. 
Doubtless that this zeal for missionary work partially came from the Second Great 
Awakening in America, concurrent with this time period at the beginning of the 19th 
century. 
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Figure 5: John Downes, commodore and commanding officer of the Quallah Battoo 
expedition65 
 
The Potomac stayed in Batavia until April 10th, and finally departed the Dutch 
East Indies, its punitive expedition completed. For the Acehnese and the other Sumatrans, 
however, their troubles with foreign powers were just beginning. The Dutch had been 
attempting to expand their colonial dominion, and Warriner noted that about ten months 
after the Potomac left Sumatra the Dutch had sent an expedition three thousand strong to 
another part of the island, probably to follow up on the American expedition.  Warriner 
recounts that the Dutch behaved arrogantly towards the natives, and the resentment 
culminated in a night ambush on the Dutch expedition, with no apparent survivors, and 
he himself seems to be surprised that the American expedition suffered not more than two 
casualties.66 After visits to China, some Pacific Islands, and South America, the Potomac 																																																								65	Goodrich-Hedrick	and	Hedrick,	“Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac,”	29.	66	Warriner,	Cruise	of	the	United	States	Frigate	Potomac	Round	the	World	During	the	Years	1831-1834.	
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finally arrived in Boston on the evening of May 22nd, 1834, after a three-year 
expedition.67 
 
The Eclipse and the Second Sumatran Expedition 
 
 The Quallah Battoo expedition was a significant attempt by the United States to 
protect its commerce in Southeast Asia. But it eventually proved to be only a temporary 
solution to a long-term problem. In 1838, just six years after the Potomac’s expedition to 
Quallah Battoo, another incident of murder occurred, this time with the American 
merchant vessel Eclipse. This was almost a repeat of what happened with the Friendship, 
and two vessels, the USS Columbia and the USS John Adams, were dispatched to Muckie, 
not far from Quallah Battoo. Two men that served aboard the Columbia, crewmember 
William Meacham Murrell and Chaplain Fitch Waterman Taylor wrote separate accounts 
of the incident, which coincidentally occurred just as both frigates were conducting their 
own global circumnavigation mission, meaning that their response to Acehnese piracy 
was more immediate.68 The report on the Eclipse incident reached the Columbia’s 
commanding officer, Commodore George C. Read, via the American consul in Penang.69 
 As with the Friendship incident, the Eclipse murders occurred due to the ship’s 
crew neglecting to observe necessary precautions. The crew of the Eclipse had actually 
requested that the Acehnese, led by a certain “Lebbey Ousso, juratoolis of Muckie,” 
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surrender their weapons for the duration of the pepper transaction.70 But Lebbey Ousso 
apparently complained afterwards to the captain, a man named Wilkins, and asked for the 
weapons to be returned while they were still on board. “From his long acquaintance with 
the man,” the report noted, “the captain did not think that he was doing an act of 
imprudence by in giving their daggers.”71 This proved to be his fatal undoing, as the next 
part of the report shows: 
 
“… The second mate and two sailors were busy in getting ready the scales for 
weighing the pepper that was on deck. As the second draught was being 
weighed, the captain, who was seated by a light near the binnacle, cried out, 
‘I am stabbed.’ The second mate, who was stooping to take up the bags, was 
stabbed in the loins. At the same time, the apprentice, who was near the 
captain, was killed by the very same hand that slew his commander.”72   
 
News of this robbery quickly alerted some other more friendly local Acehnese rulers to 
go in pursuit of the murderers, but to no avail. The report also notes that although the 
surviving crewmembers later retook the ship, they had been robbed of everything, and 
that the ship’s cook, under punishment for insubordination, had switched sides and 
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escaped with Ousso’s gang.73 With the Acehnese indifferent to their plight, the remaining 
Eclipse crew decided to write to the American consul in Penang.74 
 
 
Figure 6: Hijacking of the Eclipse75 
 
Word of the outrage galvanized the crew of both the Columbia and John Adams to 
prepare for a punitive expedition. But the endeavor came very close to ending before it 
even had a chance to begin; smallpox began to appear among the crew of the Columbia, 
and at least one crewmember succumbed to the disease.76 
 The Columbia then anchored at Annallaboo before moving again. At Quallah 
Battoo, scene of the infamous incidents only a few years before, Commodore Read 
welcomed Po Adam, the friendly Rajah. Apparently his help to Americans had not been 
forgotten, and this time he also gave crucial intelligence to the second Sumatra 
expeditionary force. He confirmed that the Columbia and John Adams have anchored at 																																																								73	Ibid.	256-257.	74	Neither	Murrell	nor	Taylor	recorded	his	name.	75	Taylor,	A	Voyage	Round	the	World,	and	Visits	to	Various	Foreign	Countries,	in	the	United	States	
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the right location, and that the perpetrators of the Eclipse incident have sought the 
protection of the local Rajah.77 He also advised the American officers on how to negotiate 
with the local ruler.78  
Commodore Read then ordered a group of his officers to come ashore to first 
speak to the Acehnese before deciding on further action.79 Could Read have possibly 
learned from Downes’ experience? This was a significant difference from the first 
expedition that was characterized by its aggressive approach. There was some concern 
among the crew that Po Adam might well betray the Americans, even though he had 
proved to be a trustworthy local ruler, but Read decided to heed his Acehnese ally’s 
advice. Indeed, Po Adam himself personally accompanied the officers that came ashore. 
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Figure 7: Po Adam, the Rajah who assisted with two American expeditions80 
  
They met on the shore “more than a hundred armed Malays.”81 A tense moment 
ensued, but Po Adam proved himself once again to be the skilled negotiator he was as he 
convinced the Acehnese to let the American delegation pass through to interview their 
chief. 																																																								80	Ibid.	267.	81	Ibid.	
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The first round of negotiations with the Rajah of Quallah Battoo went well. He 
himself denied none of the facts and promised the American delegation that he would 
deliver to them the guilty party by the next day.82 This done, Po Adam left the 
Americans, telling them that he will return to assist them again. 
Read was anxious since there was no telling that the Rajah will live up to his 
promise, and decided to be somewhat more forceful. For the second meeting he instructed 
the negotiating officers as follows: 
 
“You will make known to him that it is the desire of the Government of the 
United States to remain at peace and on terms of friendship with the chiefs 
and people of Sumatra; that we have come to the island as friends, and hope 
that we shall be enabled to leave Kwala Batu in the continuance of the same 
sentiments. But this must depend upon the readiness which shall be evinced 
by the Rajah to give up one of the murderers of Captain Wilkins, who, having 
taken refuge in Kwala Batu, has been protected by the Rajah.”83 
 
When the delegation notified the Rajah in their second interview, the Rajah simply 
replied that although he had sent his men in pursuit of the culprits, he had not been 
successful in capturing them.84 Murrell wrote in his account of the expedition that this 
was a blatant lie, that the Rajah had no intention to cooperate in capturing the murderers. 
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“His excuses were founded on prevarication,” Murrell wrote. “It was thought advisable to 
give them a few iron arguments by way of bringing them to reason.”85 
 It was about this time that another neighboring Rajah by the name of Po Nyah-
heit approached the American officers offering a buffalo and wishing to see Commodore 
Read himself.86 The Americans replied that although they could not take his buffalo, they 
would hear him out, and Po Nyah-heit proposed that should the Americans take down the 
Rajah of Quallah Battoo, he would become the new Rajah and favor the Americans. In 
other words, he was offering to become a client ruler for the United States. It was a 
tempting offer, yet at this point memories of the Revolutionary War were still fresh in the 
American imagination, and consequently Read declined this offer but told Po Nyah-heit 
that he and his family could board the ship and be protected during any hostilities 
between the United States and Quallah Battoo.87 
 Po Adam also undoubtedly wanted Quallah Battoo and its surroundings wiped off 
the map by American bombardment, as he had lost much of his domain and fortune as a 
consequence of his humanitarian assistance to the Americans.88 In a conversation with 
Commodore Read, Po Adam revealed his utter contempt for the Rajah of Quallah Battoo, 
who he blamed for backing the Eclipse’s hijackers and disturbing commerce: 
 
“Rajah is fool. He give up murderer–he give money–then he save pepper-
trade. What can Rajah do with pepper–no ships come and buy? He no eat 																																																								85	Murrell,	Cruise	of	the	Frigate	Columbia	Around	the	World,	Under	the	Command	of	Commodore	
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pepper. He give up murderer, he have plenty friends in America–they come 
and buy pepper. But he will no give up Malayu–he fool–he d–n rascal–he 
buffalo!”89  
 
Read then determined that the time for negotiations is over, and that he had to turn to the 
last resort option: armed confrontation. 
 On Christmas Day, 1838, the two frigates Columbia and John Adams commenced 
their bombardment of Quallah Battoo. The cannonade lasted for thirty minutes before the 
cease-fire order.90 At this point the Acehnese Rajahs came forward and sued for peace. At 
least two of them, the aforementioned Po Nyah-heit and his relative Po Kwala professed 
to have had no hand in the Eclipse hijacking and that they had no love for Po Chute-
Abdullah, the head chief of Quallah Battoo.91 For Po Nyah-heit, at least, because of his 
earlier overture, his fort was spared the more furious attack that destroyed the other forts. 
Never again would the Acehnese of Quallah Battoo endanger American shipping and 
commerce. 
 But the principal perpetrators of the Eclipse incident still needed to be dealt with. 
This time the frigates set course for the scene where it occurred: Muckie. Here again, as 
before, Read sought to use peaceful means first before resorting to military muscle. The 
Rajahs proved themselves to be even more uncooperative, and for a reason: 
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“It was further believed, and affirmed positively by Po Adam, that Lubby 
Sammon, a man of considerable influence here and a particular friend of the 
chief Rajah of Muckie, was the instigator; that he induced Lubby Yusuf 
(Lebbey Ousso?) to select his men, and shared a great part of the booty. This 
same man is now at Muckie, and will not be given up by the Rajah.”92  
  
 On New Year’s Day, 1839, Commodore Read ordered the Columbia and John 
Adams to open fire on Muckie. This time no mercy was shown. In addition to the 
destructive cannonade, Read authorized some 320 marines and armed seamen to 
commence landing on the shore.  Both Murrell and Taylor recorded that the landing was 
the crushing blow that finally destroyed Muckie and ended Acehnese threat to American 
merchant ships for good.93 The retaliation seemed to have gotten the message across: the 
Acehnese need not fear Americans, since the United States had no interest in territorial 
acquisition, that Americans primarily came as traders, and that the fates that befell 
Quallah Battoo and Muckie were the results of Acehnese pirates’ predation on or 
Acehnese Rajahs’ failure to protect Americans. As a result of this use of military force, 
Read successfully obtained separate agreements from the key Rajahs of Quallah Battoo, 
Muckie, and Soo Soo promising to never again molest American shipping.94 
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Figure 8: The Assault on Muckie95 
    
 
Figure 9: Commodore George Read, commander of the United States Navy’s East 
India Squadron96 
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Once Again Conspicuously Absent: The Dutch 
 At this point a number of important questions come into the narrative. Where 
were the Dutch? Did they not lay claim to the entire East Indies archipelago? Why did the 
American government decide to act on its own and send a warship without first 
consulting the Dutch government in Batavia? 
 The simplest answer to these problems could only be that the Dutch were too 
weak to enforce their claim on the East Indies. The first thirty years of Dutch crown rule 
after the VOC’s collapse had not been easy for the Dutch government to handle. Many 
areas of the archipelago outside Java were claimed, but not controlled by the Dutch. 
 Three crises that broke out illustrated the Netherlands’ struggle. The Java War 
broke out in 1825 when Prince Diponegoro in what is today Central Java and Yogyakarta 
rose up against Dutch rule.97 Although it was confined to that region of Java alone, the 
Java War proved to be the costliest colonial war the Dutch fought up to that time in terms 
of both manpower and materiel. 
 Outside of Java, the Padri War, triggered by recently returned Hajj pilgrims from 
the Arabian peninsula, also tied down Dutch military forces and severely limited their 
ability to respond to piracy and commercial trading rivals alike.98 By the time the 
Friendship and Eclipse hijacking incidents, The Dutch had already spread their efforts 
too thin and could do little as British and American merchants dominated the trade with 
Aceh. The British in particular were vehemently opposed to any attempts at Dutch 
expansion across Sumatra, and thus were determined to maintain Aceh as a buffer 																																																								97	See	P.	B.	R.	Carey,	Destiny:	The	Life	of	Prince	Diponegoro	of	Yogyakarta,	1785-1855	(Oxford:	Peter	Lang,	2014)	for	more	on	this	conflict	and	its	impact	on	Dutch	governance	over	the	East	Indies.	98	See	Jeffrey	Hadler,	“A	Historiography	of	Violence	and	the	Secular	State	in	Indonesia:	Tuanku	Imam	Bondjol	and	the	Uses	of	History,”	The	Journal	of	Asian	Studies	67,	no.	3	(2008):	971–1010	for	an	overview	of	this	colonial	war.	
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between Britain’s holdings in the Malay Peninsula and those of the Netherlands further 
south.99 
 Finally, mention must be made as well about the Belgian Revolution.100 As it 
broke out just after the close of the Java War in 1830, the events both in Europe and Asia 
nearly paralyzed the Netherlands.  When the Belgians gained independence from Dutch 
rule, it deprived the latter of even more resources. Thereafter the Netherlands was in a 
position where it became one of the weakest countries in Europe but the strongest in 
Southeast Asia, although its hold over the East Indies colony continued to be tenuous and 
was never completely secure. 
 Hence the Kingdom of the Netherlands was never in any position of power to 
interfere with British or American commercial activities until long after the Salem-
Sumatra pepper trade had ended. It was VOC bankruptcy that opened the pepper trade to 
American commerce in the first place, and it was the weakness of the Batavia 
Government that enabled the United States to act on its own and send warships to Aceh’s 
shores. 
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Epilogue: Further American Presence in the East Indies 
 
 Although the Quallah Battoo and Muckie expeditions brought peace to American 
merchants coming into Sumatra, the pepper trade between Salem and the ports of Aceh 
was not to last much longer. Other than the orders of Naval officers, there was no official 
policy on protecting the Sumatra pepper trade. The trade itself was in decline after the 
1807 embargo, followed by the War of 1812, and the last bulk shipment of pepper arrived 
in Salem onboard the brig Lucilla in 1846, an event that marked the end of a trade that 
had made Salem so rich it was named as the “Venice of North America” and even 
directly influenced the design of Salem’s city seal.101 
 
Figure 10: Salem's city seal adorning the city hall annex (Author's photo) 																																																								101	Ibid.	
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 Despite Salem’s more famous history as the location of the 17th-century witch 
trials, no pilgrim or witch adorned its city seal. Instead, an oriental looking figure is 
presented at the center, with tropical surroundings and a merchant vessel in the 
background. According to the official explanation by Salem’s city government, the seal is 
meant to depict a native Acehnese that the Salem merchants traded with for so many 
decades before the pepper trade finally stopped in 1846.102 The motto surrounding the 
Acehnese reads, “Divitis Indiae, Usque Ad Ultimum Sinum,” meaning “to the farthest 
ports of the rich east.”103 In fact, so many ships came from Salem to Sumatra that even Po 
Adam “believed Salem to be a country by itself, and one of the richest and most 
important sections of the globe.”104 So much of Salem was built with the profits of this 
trade, the best example being the Peabody Essex Museum that incorporates the old East 
India Marine Hall, home to the trading society with the same name that gave rise to the 
Salem pepper trade, and that started with objects brought back from Sumatra by the 
pepper traders. 
 Yet the end of the pepper trade did not mean the end of American interest in 
maritime Southeast Asia. In 1852, just six years after the end of the Salem pepper trade, 
American filibusterer Walter Murray Gibson made perhaps the only serious effort by any 
American to acquire territory in the East Indies.105 He attempted to meddle in local affairs 
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in his letter to the Sultan that the United States would intervene in his favor.106 This was a 
mistake, as the United States Navy’s presence in the Pacific Ocean was primarily 
concerned with protecting commerce. Not until 1898 would America would join the 
imperialist wave with the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection. 
 
Figure 11: Walter Murray Gibson as Prime Minister of the Hawaii Kingdom, 
around 30 years after his adventure in Jambi107 
 
 Even so, the nervous Dutch government took Gibson seriously, and the mere 
presence of America’s East India Squadron stationed in Hong Kong was enough to make 
the colonial government to take precautionary measures against any American 
encroachment. The Dutch decided to arrest Gibson, jail him, and put him on trial. But this 																																																								106	Ibid.	102.	107	“WalterMurrayGibson2.jpg	(JPEG	Image,	744	×	1025	Pixels)	-	Scaled	(33%),”	accessed	May	24,	2016,	https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b1/WalterMurrayGibson2.jpg.	
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did not stop Gibson, as he escaped custody in April 1853.108 He might have failed in his 
adventure, but “because of Gibson, the US public took a greater interest in the Indonesian 
archipelago in the 1850s than at any other time in the nineteenth century.”109 Gibson’s 
effort also threw light on how the Dutch jealously guarded its territories and monopolistic 
trading practices; his meddling forced the Dutch to loosen their commercial restrictions 
somewhat. Gibson himself would go on to have more filibustering adventures, eventually 
achieving briefly in Hawaii what he could not gain in Jambi.110 
 The 1861-1865 American Civil War, of course, diverted United States attention to 
domestic affairs and thus for a time diminished its presence in the international arena. But 
the last chapter of American presence in 19th century Southeast Asia before 1898 
unfolded seven years after the War Between the States ended. 
 In September 1871, a new American consul arrived in Singapore to take up his 
post. This was Brevet Major Adolphus G. Studer, formerly of the 15th Iowa Infantry in 
the Civil War.111 His appointment coincided with a period when America was 
reconsidering a revival of the pepper trade with Aceh, probably to help with the costs of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
																																																								108	Locher-Scholten,	Sumatran	Sultanate	and	Colonial	State.	102		109	Ibid.	111.	110	Ibid.	108.	111	James	Gould,	“Did	an	Iowan	Start	a	War	in	the	Indies?,”	The	Annals	of	Iowa	34,	no.	2	(October	1,	1957):	80–99.	
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Figure 12: Brevet Major Adolphus G. Studer, United States Consul in Singapore112 
  
 This was also the time period when the Dutch were beginning their encroachment 
on Aceh, but Aceh’s strategic position and the ever watchful eye of the British prevented 
the pro-war Dutch officials in the Indies from carrying out their designs in Aceh. 
Eventually, however, an opportunity presented itself when the Dutch Consul in 
Singapore, William H. Read, secretly conspired with Acehnese turncoat Teungku Arifin. 
The Dutch needed an excuse to land troops in Aceh, and there was no better way to 
accelerate that process than to make it seem as if Aceh itself was preparing for war by 
seeking alliances with countries represented at Singapore. 
																																																								112	Ibid.	
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 Arifin then approached Consul Studer during the summer of 1872, and asked if 
the United States could assist him in his effort to regain his throne, to which Studer 
replied in the negative, as America lacked interest in overseas territorial expansion.113 Yet 
not long after, in September, an official delegation from Aceh led by Tibang Muhammad 
arrived to ask for American assistance in pressuring the Dutch against any colonial 
war.114 
At this point Studer probably thought that the Acehnese would revive trade with 
America in exchange for American help against Dutch encroachment. Studer even 
posited to Rear Admiral Thornton Alexander Jenkins, commander of the United States 
Navy’s East India Squadron, to stop over at Aceh, something Jenkins prudently declined 
to do.115 The Acehnese delegation returned a short time later with a treaty proposal, a 
document now in America’s National Archives. What followed afterwards was an 
intrigue in which Read and Arifin managed to persuade the Dutch government in Batavia 
that Aceh’s search for aid had borne fruit and that the United States (and to a lesser extent 
the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy as well) was ready to aid the Acehnese, 
thus threatening Dutch sovereignty.116  The Dutch then had a ready excuse to attack 
Aceh, and concocted a story in which Consul Studer became one of the scapegoats for the 
acceleration in Dutch aggression that started the Aceh War. It would not be until 1957 
that historian James Warren Gould would be able to clear him from any wrongdoings.117 
																																																								113	Ibid.	87.	114	Ibid.	88.	115	Ibid.	89.	116	Ibid.	91-93.	117	Ibid.	98.	
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Figure 13: Rear Admiral Thornton Alexander Jenkins, commander of the United 
States Navy’s East India Squadron118 
 
Conclusion 
 
 From the sketches of American interactions with the East Indies above one can 
certainly say that neither America nor the East Indies were isolated from one another. The 
thriving pepper trade testified to America’s zeal in pursuing commerce as a means of 
nation building, and for the Acehnese it proved that they could build upon the 
relationships that grew out of trade. But the trade was disrupted by the twin incidents of 
																																																								118	“Thornton_Jenkins.JPG	(JPEG	Image,	188	×	339	Pixels),”	accessed	May	24,	2016,	https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/ed/Thornton_Jenkins.JPG.	
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Quallah Battoo and Muckie, but the resulting American responses only proved that 
America was already a formidable power even as a young republic and Aceh as the 
territory that refused to submit to Dutch rule, marking the start of strong bilateral 
relations to come. The strong connections between Indonesia and the United States came 
to the fore again when Indonesia declared its independence in 1945. The United States 
threatened to cut off Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands unless it agreed to recognize 
Indonesian sovereignty, an important episode in Indonesian independence.  
Though sporadic, the United States of America’s interactions with the East Indies 
opened new opportunities for American trading activity and led to a booming business in 
pepper. Until President Jefferson signed the 1807 Embargo Act into law, the trade in 
spices and shipping services was a sign that even if militarily America was not yet a 
global superpower that it is today, it was most definitely a rising economic power. 
America’s moment in the East Indies came as the old VOC order in the region 
collapsed under the weight of its own failure to enforce its monopoly, which left many 
regions such as Aceh independent. Merchants from Salem were only too happy to seize 
the advantage of trading pepper directly from its source, circumventing whatever was left 
of the old VOC monopoly. That the Salem-Sumatra pepper trade not only took place, but 
also boomed in the years coinciding with the VOC’s bankruptcy, is a sign of the end for 
the age of monopolistic commerce that began in 1602 with the establishment of the VOC. 
The VOC’s replacement, the Dutch crown, however, took steps to defend its 
territorial claims in the East Indies. That it fought both the Java and Padri Wars at the 
same time signaled a new attitude on the part of the government in Batavia. It saw that 
the protection of its exclusive economic rights and territorial sovereignty as inextricably 
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linked, and was why the post-VOC Batavia government vigorously pursued territorial 
expansion. Thus American presence in Southeast Asia can be seen as a wake-up call for 
the Dutch to actually control what they claimed in the first place. 
And as they no doubt saw the military power of the young United States, the 
Dutch took note as well that their claim over the East Indies was moot if they could not 
enforce it by force of arms. Though the Dutch were too weak to do anything but protest 
American punitive expeditions to Sumatra, by the start of the Aceh War their colonial 
army had become much stronger. The fact that Arifin and Read managed to cause alarm 
in Batavia by implying the possibility of American territorial expansion in Aceh showed 
that the Batavia Government never felt comfortable with American naval presence off the 
Sumatran coasts, and that even the remote possibility of an American-Acehnese treaty 
was reason enough to start a war with Aceh. 
While the Salem pepper trade took place firmly within an age when colonialism 
was on the rise, American interactions with Aceh in the early days of the United States 
should be seen as a sign that the young republic strove to differentiate itself from other 
Western powers in that American traders came purely to engage in the pepper commerce. 
True, among some US Navy officers there was discussion about joining other colonial 
powers in pursuing overseas territorial expansion.119 But time and again, whenever 
American Navy ships showed up off the coast of Sumatra, their officers refused all offers 
from the native rulers for protectorate treaties or to go beyond their mission parameters. 
The narrative of the Salem-Sumatra Pepper Trade, the two Sumatra expeditions, 
and the Singapore affair shows that the role of the United States in Southeast Asian 
history was much larger and started long before the Spanish-American War and the 																																																								119	Spector,	“The	American	Image	of	Southeast	Asia	1790-1865,	a	Preliminary	Assessment.”	304.		
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Philippine Insurrection. The coming of the Salem merchants to Aceh was the end of the 
spice trade monopoly, an obsolete, unsustainable system represented by the VOC that 
was replaced by the more enduring free-market capitalism. 
Far from being isolated from one another, the United States and Southeast Asia in 
the 18th and 19th centuries saw intense interactions exemplified by the encounters on the 
western coasts of Aceh. While the Manifest Destiny would define America’s domestic 
character, the Salem pepper trade would be the foundation of its international outlook, a 
legacy that continues to resonate to the present day. 
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Appendix: Maps 
 
The following images are maps and their insets showing the locations of pepper trading 
activities between the Salem merchants and the Acehnese.  Some of the more obscure 
place names vary in spelling, but major ports such as Annalaboo and Quallah Battoo are 
more consistent. All maps are courtesy of the Peabody Essex Museum’s Phillips Library 
(at the time of writing still in the relocated reading room in Peabody, Massachusetts). 
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